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Abstract : We assess the European Union’s (EU) most significant international
tax policy. The 2005 Tax and Savings Directive obliges cooperating jurisdictions to
withhold tax or report on interest income earned by entities whose beneficial
owner is an EU resident. As the Directive applies only to beneficial ownership in
cooperative jurisdictions, it can be circumvented by transferring ownership to a
non-EU resident or company or by transferring the entity to a non-cooperative
jurisdiction. Using a database on individual offshore entities leaked from two firms
in 2013, we compare the response of EU-owned entities with a control group of
non-EU-owned entities. We show that the growth of EU-owned entities declined
immediately after the Directive’s implementation, whereas that of non-EU-owned
entities remained stable. We observe the substitution of EU ownership for non-EU
ownership, as well as the substitution of cooperative for non-cooperative offshore
jurisdictions. This calls for anti-evasion policies that are broader in scope and scale.
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Introduction
Offshore financial activity has taken centre stage in academic and policy
debates following calls for more equitable taxation in the wake of the
2007–2008 global financial crisis [Organisation for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) 2010; Zucman 2013a, 2013b; Johannesen
2014]. Deposits in offshore entities – companies, accounts, trusts or funds
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created in low-tax, offshore jurisdictions – can be used to evade taxes on
interest income and to hide illegitimate sources of income. One recent
estimate put the unrecorded global offshore financial wealth of households
in 2008 at 7.3% of the world’s gross domestic product (GDP) (Zucman
2013a). Although the characteristic secrecy of offshore activity makes it
difficult to uncover the owners of offshore entities, anecdotal evidence
suggests that most of these entities are owned by the world’s richest
households and are used to escape taxation. A recent torrent of leaks of
offshore account owners’ details from financial services firms supports this
line of argument [International Consortium of Investigative Journalists
(ICIJ) 2013b, 2015]. Given the sums involved and the ownership of this
wealth, better-designed and better-enforced tax policy can generate large
gains in terms of equity, as Zucman (2013b) and Johannesen (2014)
pointed out.
Policy reactions over the past few years have included information
exchange agreements with offshore financial centres (OECD 2010),
amnesties for tax evaders disclosing offshore assets (Inland Revenue Service
2012) and the criminal prosecution of bankers and banks assisting with
offshoring for tax evasion (Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority
2009; US Securities and Exchange Commission 2009). Policymakers claim
some success on these measures, but the record is mixed. With regard
to information exchanges, for example, assets can be moved out of a
cooperative jurisdiction to a non-cooperative one before an enquiry begins.
Johannesen and Zucman (2014) provide empirical results that are
consistent with this behaviour. The United Kingdom’s (UK) Liechtenstein
Disclosure Facility, an amnesty agreement for British owners of offshore
Liechtenstein accounts, has from October 2009 to December 2014 yielded
GBP 1,023 million (Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs 2014). Still,
considering bank assets alone, some USD 965 million of UK bank assets
remain in Liechtenstein [Bank for International Settlements (BIS) 2014].
In this article, we build on Johannesen (2014) and analyse an important
policy initiative that preceded the global financial crisis. The European
Union’s (EU) 2005 Tax and Savings Directive aims to restrict offshore
tax evasion by EU residents. The Directive obliges cooperating offshore
jurisdictions to either withhold tax on interest income earned by entities
whose beneficial owner – ‘any individual who receives an interest payment
or any individual for whom an interest payment is secured’ [European
Commission (EC) 2003, Article 2(1)] – is an EU resident, transferring the
bulk of the tax revenue back to the resident’s home country, or to report
information on the interest payments and identities of the entity’s owners to
their home countries. Offshore centres prefer the first option because their
own banks withhold the tax, allowing them to keep the entity’s ownership
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secret, and thus keep their appeal as secretive financial centres. The
Directive manages a compromise between generating tax revenue and
maintaining banking secrecy in cooperative offshore centres.
Crucially, the Directive only applies to cooperating jurisdictions and
on a beneficial ownership basis. The Directive can be circumvented by
transferring beneficial ownership to a resident or entity that is not registered
to an address in the EU and by transferring the entity to a non-cooperating
offshore jurisdiction. Further, entity owners who allow their offshore banks
to report their interest income are exempt from the withholding tax. This
ensures the tax only affects owners who are unwilling to report their interest
income – likely tax evaders – leaving compliant entity owners unaffected.
We are interested in how offshore entity owners with undeclared offshore
assets responded to the Directive. A nonresponse outcome implies that
assets are transferred from wealthy and untaxed entity owners to their
home governments. The Directive can, however, trigger the substitution of
cooperative for non-cooperative offshore jurisdictions, further restricting
the ability of home governments to access taxable resources. We test this
substitution hypothesis using a data set on individual offshore entities that
is new to the academic debate.
In April 2013, the ICIJ released a database – the ICIJ Offshore Database –
containing some 270,000 offshore entities, covering a period of 30 years,
ending in 2010 (ICIJ 2013a, 2013b, 2013c, 2013d). The data set covers
entities incorporated in 10 jurisdictions: the British Virgin Islands (BVI), the
Cayman Islands, Cook Islands, Singapore, Hong Kong, Samoa, Seychelles,
Mauritius, Labuan andMalaysia. The data were leaked to the ICIJ from two
offshore services firms: Singapore-based Portcullis TrustNet (TNET) and
BVI-based Commonwealth Trust Limited (CTL). The only change ICIJ made
to the data was adding a country identification filter, which was the result of
an automated process that detected country information in addresses,
jurisdictions or tax statuses. This helped us to split the sample into EU-owned
and non-EU-owned entities and tomatch them to entity offshore jurisdictions.
The ICIJ removed personal information from the records, such as
e-mail addresses and telephone numbers, passport numbers and, more
problematically for our purposes, assets and financial transactions.
This brings us to two important caveats to bear in mind throughout our
analysis. First, we are working with counts of individual entities rather than
deposit values as in the study by Johannesen (2014) or Johannesen and
Zucman (2014). This means that every entity, no matter how much wealth
is actually in there, is given equal weight. Second, this is a leaked rather than
official comprehensive data set; therefore, we cannot be sure that empirical
insights drawn from it are truly generalisable. Further to this, the number of
entities with incorporation dates drops to 140,201; drops again to 124,921
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after filtering out empty home country entries; and drops again to 52,987
when filtering out empty jurisdictions, leaving us with time series that run
from 1995 to 2008. Still, it remains a large data set with a number of
advantages. First, it is a new source of evidence that can contribute to an
evidence-scarce debate. Empirical work so far relies on the same BIS
database or on the change in use of financial instruments that can be used
to evade tax policy (Klautke and Wichenreider 2010; Johannesen and
Zucman 2014). Second, it is interesting to see whether entity-level responses
differ from country-level responses and whether these differences have
implications for policy design. Third, entity incorporation dates are given
precisely to the day, meaning variation in our data is not obscured by
quarterly aggregation, and we can pick high frequency responses. Finally,
although it is a leaked data set from two private firms, these firms appear to
have commanded a large share of the market in offshore services provision.
For example, the cumulative number of company incorporations in the BVI
by 31 December 2008, the end of our study period, was 414,620 [British
Virgin Islands Financial Services Commission (BVI FSC) 2008]. The
number of BVI incorporations registered by these two firms up to this point
was 81,305 or 19.6% of the cumulative total.1
Empirically, we follow Johannesen (2014) and exploit the fact that the
Directive changed the international tax environment for EU residents but
not for non-EU residents, allowing us to identify the Directive’s causal effect
on offshore activity. We split our sample into offshore entities owned by EU
residents, our treatment group, and entities owned by non-EU entities, our
control group. By comparing the change in the growth of our treatment
group with the control group after the Directive was introduced, we can
measure the Directive’s causal effect on offshore entity growth. Our base-
line result shows a sharp downward break in the trend of EU-owned entity
growth immediately after the Directive. Non-EU-owned entities also
changed trend after the Directive, becoming increasingly upward sloping.
We show that the number of EU-owned entities declined in the week pre-
ceding the Directive’s implementation, but not before, supporting our use of
the Directive’s implementation as an appropriate cut-off point. Finally, we
show that after the Directive the ratio of non-EU to EU entity ownership
increased, and entity ownership in non-cooperating jurisdictions increased
relative to that in cooperating jurisdictions. These results are robust to time
trends, exchange-rate movements and different estimation methods and
empirical specifications.
1 See Table 1 in this article for details on the number of company registrations. The 81,305
number is the sum of BVI Business Company and BVI International Business Company
registrations.
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Our results are consistent with the substitution hypothesis. EU entity
owners did not repatriate their funds nor did they leave them put. They
instead moved their funds to non-cooperative offshore jurisdictions and
transferred beneficial ownership to non-EU residents or entities. The
implications of our results fit with Johannesen (2014). First, that offshore
entities responded so significantly to a policy intended to only affect tax
evaders implies that a large portion of offshore wealth is undeclared. Sec-
ond, that the response was so soon after the Directive implies that tax
evaders are highly responsive to changes in international tax law. Together
these implications call for a “front-loaded” rather than piecemeal approach
to policy targeted at offshore wealth.
More work related directly to the Directive includes the study by Hem-
melgarn and Nicodeme (2009), who used national account data, deposit
data and government revenue data to measure the impact of the Directive,
finding that it had no measurable effects. Klautke and Wichenreider (2010)
showed bonds that are exempt from the withholding tax due to a grand-
father clause are not associated with lower pre-tax returns than similar
taxable bonds, suggesting the existence of alternative withholding tax
avoidance measures. Similarly, Rixen and Schwarz (2012) found evidence
that investors reallocated assets from debt to equity products in the same
country in order to avoid the Directive. Johannesen and Zucman (2014),
very similar to our findings here, showed that information-exchange trea-
ties between offshore centres and home countries trigger shifts of deposits
from cooperative to non-cooperative offshore centres, but not repatriation
of funds. Finally, our article contributes to the new literature on “forensic
economics”, in which researchers aim to understand “behavior that agents
would prefer to conceal” (Zitzewitz 2012, 731).
Context
Most governments retain the right to tax interest income earned by their
citizens wherever that interest is earned. Enforcement relies on citizens
declaring their interest income from foreign countries and information
exchanges between tax authorities. According to the OECD (2006), there are
two necessary conditions for the effective exchange of tax information. First,
domestic law in the foreign jurisdiction must either allow for the sharing of
information itself or there must be a bilateral treaty between the foreign
jurisdiction and the taxpayer’s government. Second, the foreign jurisdictions
must have access to the information themselves. Banking secrecy laws, most
notably in Panama, can restrict access to information even for their own tax
authorities, which is part of their appeal as offshore jurisdictions. The EUTax
and Savings Directive is an attempt to meet these two conditions.
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The Directive covers all EU member states along with 15 cooperating
offshore centres displayed in Table 1. Plans for the Directive were
announced in June 2003, negotiations were concluded at the end of 2004
and the Directive took effect on 1 July 2005. The Directive allows for
cooperation along both conditions by giving cooperating jurisdictions two
choices. They can either withhold tax on interest income earned by offshore
entities whose beneficial owner is an EU resident, transferring 75% of the
tax revenue to the owner’s home authorities, or they can report information
on the interest income and ownership of the entity to the owner’s home
authority. For 2005, the withholding tax was set at 15%, 20% starting in
2008 and 35% starting in 2011 (Johannesen 2014, 48). The withholding
tax replaces taxes levied in the home country.
Most EU countries adopted the information-exchange condition, whereas
most cooperating offshore jurisdictions opted for the withholding condition.
This is important as it allows offshore centres to retain their purpose and
appeal as banking secrecy jurisdictions. Payment agents – banks, trusts, debt
issuers or other entities or even individuals – in cooperating jurisdictions remit
Table 1. Cooperating and non-cooperating offshore jurisdictions
Non-Cooperating Cooperating
Antigua and Barbuda Malaysia Andorra
Bahamas Marshall Islands Anguilla
Bahrain Mauritius Aruba
Barbados Mexico British Virgin Islands
Bermuda Nauru Cayman Islands
Belize Niue Guernsey
Botswana Panama Isle of Man
Brunei Philippines Jersey
Chile Qatar Liechtenstein
Cook Islands Russia Monaco
Dominica Samoa Montserrat
Ghana Seychelles Netherlands Antilles
Grenada St Lucia San Marino
Hong Kong St Kitts and Nevis Switzerland
India St Vincent and the Grenadines Turks and Caicos Islands
Indonesia Trinidad and Tobago
Jamaica United Arab Emirates
Liberia Uruguay
Lebanon US Virgin Islands
Macau Vanuatu
Notes: List of offshore centres as classified by the OECD (2004, 2006). All European
Union member states are part of the Directive.
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the withholding tax without disclosing the identity of the taxpayer, allowing
them to remain anonymous.
Although the Directive marks a big change to the international tax
environment for EU residents, the EC (2008) is itself aware of the
Directive’s limitations. The Directive can be circumvented in three
important ways, which are crucial to our empirical strategy and results.
Our following interpretation of the Directive, particularly that it de facto
affects legal persons, is not uncontroversial. In the Appendix, we provide
additional detail on this section to substantiate our interpretation and
assumptions.
First, the Directive only applies to EU and cooperating offshore
jurisdictions. A look back to Table 1 shows that there exist many more
non-cooperating offshore jurisdictions. EU residents can circumvent the
Directive by transferring their entity to one of these non-cooperating
jurisdictions while retaining beneficial ownership of their entity if they so
choose.
Second, the Directive only applies to entities whose beneficial ownership
is registered to EU residents. For example, the Directive effectively applies
to the interest income earned by EU owners of a BVI entity if they are
registered as such, but not if the entity’s beneficial ownership is registered to
a non-EU resident through the use of a nominee or master client. This
means that if EU residents transfer beneficial ownership of their entity to,
say, a BVI resident, they are out of the Directive’s scope, even though the
BVI is a cooperating jurisdiction.
Third, it is also possible for EU residents to replace their interest-yielding
assets with structured finance products whose returns are not considered
to be interest, and thus are not subject to the Directive (Klautke and
Weichenreider 2010; Johannesen 2014).
Evidence consistent with tax evasion would therefore be declining
beneficial ownership registered to EU residents, declining offshore activity
growth in cooperating jurisdictions and a switch to structured finance
products. We have no data to cover the latter type of evidence, but our
empirical strategy exploits the first two types. We test for the substitution of
EU for non-EU ownership and cooperative for non-cooperative centres.
Empirical strategy
We want to measure the Directive’s causal effect on EU-owned offshore
entity growth. Following Johannesen (2014), our identification strategy
exploits the fact that the Directive changed the international tax
environment facing EU residents, but not non-EU residents.We use the post-1
July 2005 (the Directive’s implementation date) behaviour of non-EU-owned
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entities to proxy for the counterfactual post-Directive behaviour of EU-owned
entities in the absence of the Directive to estimate a causal effect on offshore
accounts. We do this in two ways.
First, we split our sample into two different time series. The first is
our treatment series, which contains daily counts of offshore entities with
EU-resident ownership. The second is our control series, which contains
daily counts of offshore entities with non-EU-resident ownership as well as
owners not resident in an offshore centre as defined by the OECD (2004).
We then explore the changing time trends of these two series before and
after the Directive; we implement the following:
Countt = α + β1Timet + β2Directivet + β3 ðTimet ´ DirectivetÞ + θX t + εt ð1Þ
where the dependent variable is the count on day t of incorporated offshore
entities, Time is a daily time trend, Directive is a dummy that equals 1 for
the post-Directive period, the last term interacts the previous two
independent variables and under X we control for a set of covariates.
The α and ε are a constant and an error term with standard properties,
respectively. Estimating (1) separately for the treatment and control groups,
β3 shows us the change in trend in the post-Directive period. To be
consistent with the substitution hypothesis, we expect the coefficient on the
interaction term to be negative and statistically significant for the treatment
series and positive for the control series. Our main estimation technique is a
Poisson regression, which is designed for count data, and for dependent
variables that follow a Poisson distribution.2
Second, we pool the treatment and control series and estimate the
standard multi-period difference-in-difference regression framework
(Angrist and Pischke 2009); we implement the following:
Countit = α + β1Timet + β2Directivet + β3 ðTreatmenti ´ DirectivetÞ + θX t + εit ð2Þ
where i indexes treatment or control group observations, and β3 now
measures the average deviation from the general time trend in
post-implementation periods. We expect this coefficient to be significant
and negative, implying a downward break in trend in the incorporation of
offshore entities owned by EU residents.
We cross-check the results of (1) and (2) using different estimation
methods and by using different outcome variables.
2 With a mean value of 5.2 daily counts and an SD of 6.86, the skew of the treatment series is
3.20. The values of the control series are, respectively, 10.8, 14.25 and 6.34.
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Data
In 2012, the ICIJ received a hard drive, anonymously mailed to its director,
Gerard Ryle, containing 260 gigabytes of files leaked from two organisa-
tions: TNET, based in Singapore, and CTL, based in the BVI. Both firms,
which the ICIJ calls “offshore service providers” in its publications, set up
overseas companies and trusts for clients around the world. TNET has
offices in the BVI, the Cayman Islands, the Cook Islands, Hong Kong,
Mauritius, Samoa, the Seychelles, Singapore and Taiwan, offering services
in each of those jurisdictions. Its services include “customised corporate,
trustee and fund administration and management services to private
individuals, institutions and professional advisers and their clients around
the world” (TNET 2015). CTL is headquartered in the BVI but also
operates in other offshore jurisdictions, including the Bahamas and Belize
(Norddeutscher Rundfunk 2013).
Among the leaked files were Microsoft Access databases that contained
the firms’ operational data, including all the overseas entities that they set
up for their clients. The ICIJ worked with database engineers to write
scripts to produce a union of the two databases, clean the data in the
resulting database using Talend ETL (extract, transform and load) software
and model it as a single graph database with entities (companies and trusts),
addresses and people as nodes and the relationships between them as edges
(ICIJ 2013a, 2013b, 2013c, 2013d). The data set used in this article is the
product of that process, released to the public by the ICIJ along with the
publication of the investigation.
As illustrated by Table 2, the data set contains a large volume of
companies registered in the BVI, which can be attributed to one of the
original databases, from CTL, which is based in Tortola. It also reflects a
global trend of the BVI as a popular offshore jurisdiction, with just under
0.5 million active offshore companies in a country with a population of
28,000, representing 40% of all offshore companies registered worldwide
(World Bank 2011). We can get a sense of how representative these
data are, or in other words how large these firms’ market share in offshore
financial services provision was, by looking at the number of companies
they registered versus the total number of companies registered.
The cumulative number of company incorporations in the BVI by
31 December 2008, the end of our study period, was 414,620 (BVI FSC
2008, 1). The number of BVI incorporations registered by these two firms
up to this point, as can be seen in Table 3, was 81,305 or 19.6% of the
cumulative total. The second biggest number of registrations was for
companies in Samoa. We do not have a cumulative total number of regis-
trations for this jurisdiction, but we know that the number of registrations
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Table 2. Entity types in the original data set
Type Registrations
BVI Business Company 43,981
BVI International Business Company 37,324
Samoa International Company 8,082
Cayman Islands International Company 1,257
Hong Kong Domestic Company 1,136
Cayman Islands Asset Protection Trust 989
Singapore Domestic Company 696
Cayman Exempt 620
Labuan Offshore Company 413
Seychelles IBC 386
Notes: Samoa, Hong Kong, Singapore, Labuan and Seychelles are
non-cooperative jurisdictions. British Virgin Islands (BVI) entities
may be registered to BVI corporations rather than the actual country
of residence, exempting them from the European Union’s Tax and
Savings Directive. The only entities liable to domestic corporate
income tax are Labuan (3%), Hong Kong (16.5%) and Singapore
(17–20%). The only domestic withholding taxes are in Hong Kong
(17–20%) and Singapore (10–15%).
Table 3. Summary statistics
Observations Mean SD Minimum Maximum
Count 3,829 7.9 11.5 1 220
Treatment 1,941 5.2 6.9 1 62
Control 1,888 10.8 14.3 1 220
Time 5,114 2,558 1,476 1 5,114
Directive 5,114 0.3 0.4 0 1
Interaction 5,114 1,119 1,947 0 5,114
USD/DKK 3,626 6.5 1.0 4.7 9.0
USD/SDK 3,626 7.9 1.2 5.8 11.0
USD/GBP 3,626 0.6 0.1 0.5 0.7
USD/EUR 3,626 0.9 0.1 0.6 1.2
Sham 1,883 5.6 6.8 0.0 50.0
Notes: Count is the daily count of newly incorporated Treatment [European Union
(EU)] and Control (non-EU) offshore entities. Time is a daily time trend, whose
maximum number is the total number of days in the period. Directive equals 1 for days
that fall under the EU Tax and Savings Directive. Interaction is an interaction term
between the previous two variables.
USD/DKK = US dollar to Danish kronor exchange rate; SDK = Swedish kronor;
GBP = British pound; EUR = euro; British Virgin Islands (BVI)/Treatment = ratio of
BVI-registered and held entities to EU-registered entities.
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in 2008 alone was just 53 (Government of Samoa 2011, 84). If this annual
number of registrations was constant, it would take 152 years to reach the
8,082 registrations in Table 2.
The distinction between the top two types, BVI Business Company and BVI
International Business Company, is worth pointing out. The BVI Business
Companies Act came into force on 1 January 2005, replacing the BVI Inter-
national Business Companies Act, partly as a result of external pressure.
Under the previous BVI International Business Companies Act, companies
were exempt from taxation in the BVI; now theymay be liable for stamp duty,
but only on the transfer of real estate and assets in a BVI company owning real
estate in the BVI. The new Business Company Act came into force as the BVI
set income tax at 0. Samoa, Hong Kong, Singapore, Labuan and Seychelles
are non-cooperative jurisdictions in the Directive. BVI entities may be regis-
tered to BVI (“sham”) corporations rather than actual country of residence,
exempting them from the EU Tax and Savings Directive, a fact that we
empirically explore later. The only entities liable to domestic corporate
income tax are Labuan (3%), Hong Kong (16.5%) and Singapore (17–20%).
The only domestic withholding taxes are in Hong Kong (17–20%) and
Singapore (10–15%).
Unfortunately, the data set contains no data other than the associated
country of an individual that would allow us to build an accurate
demographic picture of the offshore service providers’ clients and the
officers of the registered companies.
Still, the ICIJ’s investigation showed thatmany of the offshore entities in the
database were registered by CTL and TNET on behalf of “master
clients” (ICIJ 2013a, 2013b, 2013c, 2013d), middlemen representing the
real owners of those entities, whom the ICIJ has characterised as “shady
operators”. In the case of CTL, master clients were required to perform due
diligence and what is known in the sector as “know your client” (KYC) but
were crucially not obliged to provide proof of that diligence to CTL (1999).
The result, according to the ICIJ, was that CTL was investigated by the BVI’s
Financial Services Commission, which determined that “CTL had breached
the BVI’s anti-money laundering laws by failing to verify and record the
identity of its clients” (ICIJ 2013a, 2013b, 2013c, 2013d). Indeed, the ICIJ
found that 23 BVI companies registered by CTL were linked to money
laundering from aRussian tax refund scam investigated byHermitage Capital
Management, a Russia-focussed hedge fund, and Sergei Magnitsky (of the
2012 United States Magnitsky Act), its legal representative in Russia. The
investigation by the BVI Financial Services Commission spanned five years
and led to the banning of CTL from taking on new clients until it was
purchased by Equity Trust in 2009 and its new owners agreed to follow
regulations. The stricter regulations led CTL staff to complain in internal
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e-mails that sales volumes had fallen 20% year on year and of “significant legal
changes which many clients see as making the BVI a somewhat less ‘friendly’
place to base a company than other competing jurisdictions” (CTL 2008).
Our goal was to extract from these data files time series of the daily
counts of incorporated offshore entities registered to EU and non-EU resi-
dents. To do this, we first filtered out all entities without home country and
incorporation data, which are essential for our analysis. This leaves us with
126,686 entities. Second, although the data range from a record in 1918
(a likely source error) to a record in 2020 (future incorporation dates), we
focus on the 1995 to 2008 period. Records from the 1918 to 1994 period
only account for 1.39% of the sample, and records from the 2009 to 2020
period for another 2.19%. Very often during the excluded periods, there is
only one entity per year, meaning that these years, although forming most
of the period, contain little information. The resulting period is a year
longer than Johannesen’s (2014) quarterly data set that runs from 1995 to
2007. This gives a total of 122,145 entities and a yearly median of 7,741
entities. As in the study by Johannesen (2014, 50), we limit this sample
along two other dimensions.
First, we exclude entities belonging to offshore countries, that is, offshore
entities registered as having an offshore country as their home country. BVI as
a home country, for example, accounts for 54%of all entities. Thismost likely
reflects the use of “sham” corporations, which we analyse in the following
section. Including these offshore-registered entities would bias our results, as
the Directive may have increased the use of “sham” corporations, because
they in effect allow EU residents to register as residents in offshore countries,
thus evading the withholding tax. This leaves us with 34,953 entities. Second,
in our EU group, we only include countries that were alreadymember states in
1995, leaving out those that joined in the 2004–2007 enlargement period. The
later member states signed various agreements with offshore centres at more
or less the same time they signed onto the Directive, and it is not possible to
credibly disentangle the effects of the Directive versus the bilateral agreements.
The 14 EU countries in our treatment group are as follows: Austria, Belgium,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Nether-
lands, Portugal, Sweden, Spain and the UK. The treatment group accounts for
29% of all 34,953 entities; the remainder are in the control group.3
Table 3 summarises our main variables. The frequency of all observa-
tions is daily. The Treatment group variable shows a mean daily count of
3 Control group member countries: Australia, Belarus, Brunei, Canada, China, Costa Rica,
Fiji, Georgia, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Malaysia,
Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, the Philippines, Puerto Rico, Russia, Serbia, Singapore, South
Africa, South Korea, Syria, Taiwan and Thailand.
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offshore entity incorporations of 5.2, with an SD of 6.9. We have 1,941
observations for the entire period. The gaps in the series do not necessarily
imply 0 counts, but rather missing or cleaned data (exclusion on account of
no home country values). For this reason, we err on the side of caution and
leave those gaps as they are rather than impute 0 values. The same holds
for the Control group variable, where we have 1,888 observations. Our
strategy involves looking at estimated trends across the whole period in
these incomplete series, so that we are in effect interpolating missing values.
The Control group has a higher mean value, at 10.8, as it is composed of
many more countries than the Treatment group. The Time variable cumula-
tively adds each day in the sample, so that the length of our period is
5,114 days. We use this variable to estimate time trends in the values of
the Treatment and Control groups over the whole period, as well as for
pre- and post-Directive sub-periods. These sub-periods are identified using the
Directive dummy variable, which takes a value of 0 for all days leading up to
1 July 2005, and a value of 1 for all remaining days. Interaction is our main
variable of interest: it is an interaction of the previous two variables, and in the
empirical analysis it shows us whether the trend growth of the treatment and
control groups differs in the post-Directive period. We control for movements
in major exchange rates, which provide a useful daily indicator of economic
cycles around the world, which may affect the formation of offshore entities in
the treatment versus control group. The rates, all against the USD, are for the
Danish kronor, the Swedish kronor, the British pound sterling and the euro.
They are from Global Financial Data (2015). The number of exchange-rate
observations is less than the total number of days as currencies are not traded
on weekends. The final variable, BVI/Treatment, is the ratio of BVI offshore
entities with the BVI registered as their home address to the Treatment entities
variable. In our empirical analysis, we use this ratio to model the growth of
BVI-registered entities relative to EU-registered entities before and after the
Directive. If the Directive led to more “sham” corporations, then we should
expect this ratio to exhibit faster growth in the post-Directive period. We trun-
cated this ratiomaking it a series of whole numbers, so that we can be consistent
in our use of Poisson estimations for count data. The skewness statistics for the
treatment and control groups are, respectively, 3.20 (mean of 5.2) and 6.34
(mean of 10.8), implying positive skews in line with a Poisson distribution.
Empirical results
Basic time trends
To get an initial feel for the data, Table 4 shows the results of four simple
regressions. We regressed the daily treatment and control series on a time
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trend for a subsample ending a day before the Directive and then on a
subsample beginning on the day of the Directive. For the treatment series,
we get a positive and significant coefficient in the pre-Directive subsample,
indicating positive growth, but in the post-Directive subsample we
get a negative (but insignificant) coefficient, indicating a reversal in trend.
Further, the control series yields positive and significant coefficients, the
post-Directive coefficient being slightly larger, in both periods.
We use the coefficients from Table 4 to predict the time trends of both
series before and after the Directive. The results are plotted in Figure 1. It is
clear that both the treatment and the control series were growing in
synchronisation before the Directive. This is an important point, as it
implies that the treatment and control groups were similar before the
Directive. Thereafter, the treatment series diverged from the control,
indicating lower daily counts of offshore entities registered to EU residents.
The control series continued on its upward trajectory.
The database also contains limited information on the dormancy
dates – dates when offshore entities stopped being active – of entities. We
should expect the Directive to give EU owners of offshore entities an
incentive to close their existing entities and open new ones that are
non-EU-owned. To get a handle on this, we ran the same specification as in
Table 4 for our treatment series, but switched the dependent variable to
daily counts of registered dormancies instead of incorporations. With this
dependent variable, we should expect a significant and positive coefficient
on the time trend for the post-Directive period – that is, an increase in the










Frequency Daily Daily Daily Daily
Estimation Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson
Series Treatment Treatment Control Control
Dependent Count Count Count Count
Time 0.0005 (0.000)*** −0.0002 (0.0002) 0.0003 (0.000)*** 0.0004 (0.0001)**
n 1,355 586 1,304 583
Pseudo R2 0.1097 0.0025 0.0589 0.0126
LR χ2 185.8 1.67 71.62 6.23
Log-likelihood −3,633 −3,556 −3,556 −3,556
Notes: The dependent variable is the daily count of newly incorporated Treatment
[European Union (EU)] or Control (non-EU) offshore entities. Time is a daily time
trend. Estimated using Poisson count regressions. Robust standard errors in brackets.
Statistical significance: ***1 and **5%.
LR = Likelihood Ratio.
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dormancies of EU-owned entities after the Directive’s implementation. This
is supported by the results in Table 6. In the pre-Directive period, there is no
significant trend of dormancies. In the post-Directive period, the trend is
significant and positive: the post-Directive period was associated with an
increase in the number of dormancies of EU-owned entities.
We predict a time trend of the dormancy series using the coefficient in the
first column in Table 5 (the pre-Directive coefficient) and predict another
using the coefficient in the second column of Table 5 (the post-Directive
coefficient). The results are displayed in Figure 2. The first series shows a
stable and gradual increase in the number of dormancies over time. The
second series, however, shows a dramatic increase in the number of dormancies
for the post-Directive period. By the end of the period, the first series predicts a
dormancy count of around 150 compared with 400 for the second series.
Although consistent with a sharp response to the Directive by EU entity
owners, this simple exercise is limited. First, we are “manually” splitting the
sample into two periods rather than using the whole length of the series and
including an interaction and dummy term for the Directive period. Second,
the dormancy series contains a very limited number of observations,
making an inference unreliable. Third, neither estimation controls for cur-
rency movements; the differing trends in EU-owned and non-EU-owned
entities may reflect different business cycles in different economies.
Exchange rates provide useful daily time series that can help control for
this. The following exercises seek to address these issues.
Figure 1 Time trends in treatment and control offshore entities with no interaction term.
Notes: Time trends estimated using results from Table 5.
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Baseline estimation
In Table 6, we run the full specification represented in model (1) for our
control and treatment series. Column 1 contains the results for the treat-
ment series. It shows positive and significant coefficients for the time trend






Time 0.0009 (0.0006) 0.002 (0.0008)**
n 48 36
Pseudo R2 0.053 0.212
LR χ2 1.89 8.72
Log-likelihood −1,609 −3,606
Notes: The dependent variable is the daily count of entities that registered as
“dormant”. The “dormancy date” is the date on which the entity stopped being active.
Treatment (European Union) refers to offshore entities. Time is a daily time trend.





















































Treatment pre-trend Treatment post-trend
Figure 2 Time trends in treatment entity closures with no interaction term.
Notes: Time trends estimated using results from Table 6.
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Table 6. Baseline estimation of treatment and control offshore entities
Period 1/1/1995–31/12/2008 1/1/1995–31/12/2008 1/1/1995–31/12/2008 1/1/1995–31/12/2008
Frequency Daily Daily Daily Daily
Estimation Poisson Poisson OLS OLS
Sample Treatment Control Treatment Control
Dependent Count Count Count Count
Interaction −0.0007 (0.000)*** 0.0001 (0.0001) −0.0033 (0.001)** 0.0037 (0.0025)
Directive 3.016 (0.687)** −0.496 (0.722) 16.651 (5.945)** −15.0 (10.893)
Time 0.0004 (0.000)*** 0.0003 (0.000)*** 0.0015 (0.0001)*** 0.0025 (0.0003)***
n 1,941 1,888 1,941 1,888
Pseudo R2/R2 0.167 0.0939 0.1559 0.066
LR χ2/F-test 504.14 197.72 129.39 59.25
Log-likelihood/RMSE −7,189 −11,662 6.313 13.788
Notes: The dependent variable is the daily count of newly incorporated Treatment [European Union (EU)] or Control (non-EU) offshore
entities. Time is a daily time trend. Directive is a dummy that takes one for all days when the Directive is in operation. Interaction is
Directive ×Time. Estimated using Poisson count regressions or ordinary least squares (OLS). The root mean square error (RMSE), R2 and
F-test refer to the OLS estimates. Robust standard errors in brackets.








and for the Directive dummy. The latter reflects the higher absolute daily
count numbers in the post-Directive period, and the former reflects the
overall positive trend growth for the length of the series. An explanation for
this result is CLT and TNET gaining an increasingly larger share of the
increasingly larger global offshore activity market. The interaction term,
however, is negative and highly significant. This supports the sharp break in
the trend we highlighted in Table 4 and Figure 1: a cut back on the number
of offshore entities registered to EU owners.
Is it a large effect? As this is a Poisson regression, the coefficient shows the
difference in the logs of daily counts for a unit change in the independent
variable. The interaction term thus implies that for every day in the
post-Directive period the daily count drops by ×0.999 (exp[ − 0.0007]).
Therefore, at the end of the 1,279 days of the post-Directive period, the
mean daily count of 5.2 would drop to 2.1 (5.2 × exp[−0.0007]1279) – that
is, a reduction of 59%. This 59% figure represents the efficiency loss
associated with the Directive’s introduction.
Although this is a large effect, the positive coefficients on the time trend and
directive dummy imply that the Directive still did not give rise to a permanent
downward-level shift in the daily growth of EU-owned entities. That it slowed
down the growth of such entities but did not drop the level substantially
perhaps speaks to a degree of effectiveness. Recall that a nonresponse is the
ideal outcome for EU policymakers, as it means assets are being transferred
from wealthy offshore entity owners to their home countries in the EU.
Column 2 shows the results for the control series. The results are expectedly
different: a positive, but insignificant coefficient on the interaction term and a
highly significant time trend coefficient. Columns 3 and 4 show ordinary least
squares (OLS) estimates of the same specification, where the hierarchies and
significance levels of the coefficients remain the same.
Strong support of the substitution hypothesis would require a positive and
significant coefficient on the control series’ interaction term. Although this
coefficient is positive, it is insignificant. Still, a clear divergence between the two
series is clear in Figure 3, which uses the results in Table 6 to again predict the
daily count series. That thismatches Figure 1 so closely supports an EU-specific
response to the Directive. Substitution is still possible, as it may be occurring
for “home” countries not included in our sample. Although our data set
constrains what we can do, we explore this issue in the final empirical exercise.
Preemptive response to the Directive
Next, we ask the following question – Was there also a response to the
Directive before it was implemented? This is interesting in itself, but also
because using the Directive’s implementation date as our cut-off point may
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be problematic if entity owners altered their tax status well in advance of
the Directive.
The high frequency nature of our data set allows us to narrow down
variation much more than the quarterly intervals used by Johannesen
(2014), who found outflows in the two quarters preceding and succeeding
the Directive. For the coefficients and robust standard errors plotted in
Figure 4, we estimated model (1) on the treatment series, extending it by
including weekly dummy variables for the four weeks immediately before
and after the Directive.4 The “week 0” dummy variable is centred on the
day of the Directive; increasing negative numbers indicate weeks further
back in time from the Directive, and increasing positive numbers indicate
weeks further forward in time from the Directive. The figure shows coeffi-
cients that are mostly below 0, but also insignificant. The two significant
coefficients, however, are for “week 1”, with a z-score of −21.78, and for
“week 4”, with a z-score of −4.12. We do not want to push too hard on
Figure 4 as there is a lot of noise in the data, but the high level of significance
on “week 1” indicates some movement of ownership out of the EU in the
last few days of the pre-Directive period. As such, we are reassured that
using the Directive’s implementation date as our cut-off point is reliable.
Figure 3 Time trends in treatment and control offshore entities with interaction term.
Notes: Time trends estimated using results from the first and second columns in Table 7.
4 Including weekly dummies does not change any of the other coefficients or regression
diagnostics. Results are available upon request.
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Pooled estimation
Here, we pool the treatment and control series, and replace the usual
interaction term with an interaction between a dummy that identifies
treatment observations only and the Directive dummy. Rather than
comparing time trends by group, this pooled empirical setting allows us to
measure how the time trend of treatment entities deviates from the general
time trend in the post-implementation period. This is the standard time
series difference-in-difference regression framework (Angrist and Pischke
2009). The results are given in Table 7.
The Poisson estimation in the first column shows a highly significant and
negative coefficient on the interaction term, implying that the treatment
series deviated downwards significantly during the post-implementation
period. The effect implies that the treatment group’s daily count for the
post-Directive period was ×0.59 lower (exp[− 0.538]) than that of the
control group. In other words, as the control group’s post-Directive mean
daily count was 15.1, the interaction term coefficient implies that the
treatment group’s daily mean daily count was 8.9 (15.1 × exp[−0.538]).
This result also indicates that the difference in growth rates between the
treatment and control series is statistically significant. The second column
contains the results of an OLS estimation, which support the Poisson esti-
mates. Although it is difficult to compare the OLS and Poisson coefficients
on the interaction term, the ratios of their coefficients to their robust stan-
dard errors are similar: −7.83 for the OLS estimate against −8.21 for the
Figure 4 ± 4 weekly response of the treatment group to the Directive.
Notes: Estimated by extending column 1 of Table 3 to include week dummy
variables for 4 weeks before and 4 weeks after the Directive. Week 0 is centred on
the day of the Directive. The two significant coefficients are for “week 1”, with
a z-score of −21.78, and for “week 4”, with a z-score of −4.12. Coef. is the
coefficient on the week dummy.
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Poisson estimate. In both cases, the post-implementation deviation of the
treatment series from the general trend is negative, highly significant
and large.
Controlling for exchange-rate movements
The divergence between our treatment and control series may reflect
diverging economic conditions in the treatment versus the control group.
We do not think this is likely, as the break in trend occurred in mid-2005,
when all economic regions were growing in synchronisation, which con-
tinued well into the global financial crisis after which economic regions
went into decline.5 Still, exchange rates provide a useful daily-frequency
control for differing economic conditions in home countries, as well as for
the changing relative values of international wealth. In Table 9, we intro-
duce as controls daily time series for the USD exchange rate with the euro,
British pound sterling and Swedish and Danish kroners. As described in the






Interaction (Treatment ×Directive) −0.538 (0.065)*** −6.265 (0.799)***
Directive 0.175 (0.084)** 3.991 (0.866)***
Time 0.0007 (0.000)*** 0.005 (0.000)***
n 3,831 3,831
Pseudo R2/R2 0.125 0.098
LR χ2/F-test 504.14 115.15
Log-likelihood/RMSE 470.93 10.909
Notes: The dependent variable is the daily count of newly incorporated Treatment
[European Union (EU)] and Control (non-EU) offshore entities. Time is a daily time
trend. Directive is a dummy that takes 1 for all days when the Directive is in operation.
Interaction is Directive ×Treatment dummy. Robust standard errors in brackets.
OLS = ordinary least squares; RMSE = root mean square error.
Statistical significance: ***1 and **5%.
5 We extracted the first principal component from the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF)
annual real GDP growth series from 1995 to 2010 for the euro area, the Commonwealth,
emerging Asia, emerging Europe, Latin America, the Middle East and North Africa, and Sub-
Saharan Africa, finding that it accounts for 55% of the total variation with an eigenvalue of 3.85
(IMF 2014). Adding the second component, we account for 73% of all variation. Results are
available upon request.
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data section, these currencies cover the EU countries included in our treat-
ment series. The results remain unchanged: a negative and significant
interaction term for the treatment series, but a positive and insignificant one
for the control series.
Figure 5 uses the results in Table 8 to predict the daily counts. It shows
that including exchange rates did not change the timing of the divergence
either. In fact, Figure 5 shows that before the Directive there was some small
degree of convergence of the treatment on the control series; it is only after
the Directive that it diverged.
Sham corporations and substitution
To get a tighter specification on the substitution hypothesis, we looked into
the proliferation of “sham corporations”. Transferring beneficial owner-
ship of assets from an individual (natural person) beneficial owner to a
corporation is a popular way of ensuring secrecy for tax evaders. Many
offshore centres such as the BVI, Samoa or Panama specialise in incor-
poration and domiciliation services. Clients would approach their bank to
set up a sham corporation in which they can deposit their funds. The bank
would liaise directly with a firm in an offshore centre that offers incor-
poration services on behalf of its client. Working together, the bank and the
incorporation services firm create an offshore holding company for the
Figure 5 Time trends in treatment and control offshore entities with exchange-rate
controls.
Notes: Estimated using results from Table 9.
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bank’s client, with the beneficial ownership residence being the country of
the incorporation services firm. In this way, EU residents can evade the
Directive’s scope without leaving the Directive’s area of jurisdiction: they
are no longer the beneficial owners of the entity – the sham corporation is.
This is important in our context as it means EU residents can in effect
substitute their residency. Say an EU resident owns an entity in the BVI. As
it stands, this puts them in the scope of the Directive. If, however, the
resident simply transfers beneficial ownership to a corporation or indivi-
dual registered as resident in the BVI, then they are no longer in the
Directive’s scope, despite the new owner being in the BVI, which is a
cooperating jurisdiction.
Indeed, our data set points to the BVI as being a major offshore sham
corporation jurisdiction. Some 54% of all entities in our data set are
registered to an owner address in the BVI. This alone is suspicious as, unlike
the Cayman Islands or Bermuda, the BVI does not have a large enough
domestic financial sector to account for such a large share of the sample
offshore account stock.
If offshore entity owners are making use of this substitution facility, then
we should expect the number of entities that are both incorporated and






Interaction −0.001 (0.000)*** 0.0001 (0.0002)
Directive 3.712 (0.709)*** −0.279 (0.774)
Time 0.0004 (0.000)*** 0.0003 (0.000)***
USD exchange rate EUR, GBP, SDK, DNK EUR, GBP, SDK, DNK
n 1,935 1,885
Pseudo R2 0.1715 0.0993
LR χ2 539.27 211.72
Log-likelihood −7,133 −11,572
Notes: The dependent variable is the daily count of newly incorporated Treatment
[European Union (EU)] or Control (non-EU) offshore entities. Time is a daily time
trend. Directive is a dummy that takes 1 for all days when the Directive is in operation.
Interaction is Directive ×Time. Estimated using Poisson count regressions. Robust
standard errors in brackets. All exchange rates with USD.
USD = US dollar; EUR = euro; GBP = British pound; SDK = Swedish kronor;
DNK = Danish kronor.
Statistical significance: ***1 and **5%.
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owned in the BVI (rather than just incorporated) to increase relative to the
number of EU-owned entities. For the dependent variable in Table 10, we
calculated the ratio of the two series, truncating it so that the ratio is
rounded to whole integers in order to keep the results comparable with
previous tables. As expected, the coefficient on the interaction term has
changed sign and retained a high level of statistical significance. This effect
would have taken the sham ratio mean of 5.6 up to 25.9 (5.6 × exp
[0.0012]1279) from the start to the end of the post-Directive period: a 364%
increase in the ratio.
The second column switches the dependent variable to the daily count of
BVI-owned entities. Here, we see a large positive coefficient of the directive
dummy, implying a higher count level, but a negative coefficient on the
interaction term, implying a downward break in the ownership of BVI
entities. This is seemingly at odds with our expectation of an increase in BVI
ownership and the results in column 1, but this coefficient is capturing a
general slowdown in offshore activity. The expectation is one of a
substitution of EU ownership for BVI ownership rather than simple growth
in BVI ownership. In column 3, we again express the BVI owner count as a
ratio to the total entity count, and find coefficients that are the same in
direction and significance as those in column 1. In short, the results in
Table 9 are consistent with the substitution hypothesis.
As with previous estimates, we use the main results – column 1 – in
Table 9 to predict the ratio series. The result of this exercise in Figure 6
shows clearly a sharp increase in the count of BVI entities relative to
EU entities in the weeks immediately succeeding the Directive. Further to
this, the ratio was in decline for the five years preceding the Directive: this
break in trend was not one of acceleration, but reversal – that is, the
Directive led to amovement away from taxable entities and into nontaxable
entities.
Finally, in Table 10, we exploit the difference between cooperative and
non-cooperative offshore centres. The Directive gives EU residents fewer
incentives to open new entities in, say, the BVI, where they might be regis-
tered as owners, but more incentives to open entities in jurisdictions such as
Singapore, where the Directive does not apply regardless of the owner’s
residence. We swap our treatment and control group dichotomy for a
cooperative centre and non-cooperative centre one. The interaction term is
now between a dummy that takes 1 if the entity is owned in a cooperative
offshore centre and the usual directive dummy that takes 1 for the
post-Directive period. The coefficient on this term is significant and
negative, implying a large downward break in the trend of entity growth in
cooperative centres. The effect implies that the cooperative group’s daily
count for the post-Directive period was ×0.1 lower (exp[ − 2.385]) than that
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of the control group. In other words, as the non-cooperative group’s post-
Directive mean daily count was 13.8, the interaction term coefficient
implies that the cooperative group’s daily mean daily count was 1.4
(13.8 × exp[− 2.385]).
We get a sense of how large this effect is by using the results in Table 10 to
predict the daily count of entities owned in cooperative jurisdictions. The
results are displayed in Figure 7. The pre-Directive period was one of
volatile but secular growth in the daily count of entities owned in
cooperative centres. After the Directive, the daily count collapsed from a
level of around 10 per day to 1.5 per day. We regard this result, along with
Figure 6, as strong evidence of the substitution hypothesis.
Conclusion
The 2005 EU Tax and Savings Directive targeted tax evasion by EU
residents by introducing a 15% withholding tax on interest income earned
Table 9. Sham corporations and European Union offshore entities
Period 1/1/1995–31/12/2008 1/1/1995–31/12/2008 1/1/1995–31/12/2008
Frequency Daily Daily Daily
Estimation Poisson Poisson Poisson
Sample Treatment Treatment Treatment
Dependent BVI/treatment BVI BVI/total
Interaction 0.0012 (0.000)*** −0.0009 (0.000)*** 0.0003 (0.000)**
Directive −4.994 (0.981)** 3.928 (0.334)*** −1.039 (0.430)**
Time −0.0001 (0.000)** 0.0004 (0.000)*** −0.0001 (0.000)**
USD exchange rate EUR, GBP, KRN, DNK EUR, GBP, KRN, DNK EUR, GBP, KRN, DNK
n 1,880 3,356 1,926
Pseudo R2 0.031 0.365 0.006
LR χ2 57.47 2,349.6 48.50
Log-likelihood −8,449 −21,859 −3,244
Notes: The dependent variable in the first column is the truncated ratio of British
Virgin Islands (BVI) entities whose home address is also in the BVI to treatment group
entities. The dependent variable in second column is entities with BVI home address.
The dependent variable in third column is the truncated ratio of BVI home address
entities to total entity count (sum of treatment and control group counts). Time is a
daily time trend. Directive is a dummy that takes 1 for all days when the Directive is in
operation. Interaction is Directive ×Time. Estimated using Poisson count regressions.
Robust standard errors in brackets. All exchange rates with USD.
USD = US dollar; EUR = euro; GBP = British pound; DNK = Danish kronor.
Statistical significance: ***1 and **5%.
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Figure 6 Time trends in British Virgin Islands (BVI)/treatment offshore entities
with exchange-rate controls.
Notes: Estimated using results from Table 10.






Interaction (Cooperative Centre ×Directive) −2.385 (0.041)***
Directive 0.699 (0.054)***
Time 0.0001 (0.000)***





Notes: The dependent variable is the daily count of all offshore entities in both cooperative
and non-cooperative jurisdictions. Time is a daily time trend. Directive is a dummy that
takes one for all days when the Directive is in operation. Interaction is the entity’s location
in either a cooperative (=1) or non-cooperative (=0) jurisdiction×Directive. Estimated
using Poisson count regressions. Robust standard errors in brackets. All exchange rates
with US dollar.
USD = US dollar; EUR = euro; GBP = British pound; KRN = Swedish krona;
DNK = Danish krone.
Statistical significance: ***1%.
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in cooperating offshore centres. In this article, we tested the hypothesis that
the implementation of the Directive led to a substitution of EU-owned
offshore entities for non-EU-owned offshore entities on a novel data set
covering individual offshore entities from 1995 to 2008. We did this
by splitting our sample into EU-owned (our treatment group) and
non-EU-owned (our control group) offshore entities, and examining the
changing growth trends before and after the Directive in each group. We
also examined the growth in entities owned in offshore centres outside the
Directive’s jurisdiction relative to growth of entities within the Directive’s
jurisdiction. According to our results, the Directive was associated with
a substitution of EU for non-EU ownership and cooperating for
non-cooperating jurisdictions. There are some caveats to bear in mind.
First, our data set is on individual entities rather than deposit amounts.
This means that each observation is equally weighted, even though the
entities may hold different asset values. Second, our data set is leaked from
two offshore financial services firms and does not provide comprehensive
international coverage. It is difficult to assess the severity of these con-
straints, but at the very least it fits with the research that does use asset
values and more comprehensive data sets (Zucman 2013a; Johannesen
2014; Johannesen and Zucman 2014). Further, our article adds to the
debate in two ways. First, it brings new evidence to the debate that has so
far been dominated by the same BIS data set (Johannesen and Zucman



















































Figure 7 Time trends in cooperative offshore entities with exchange-rate controls.
Notes: Estimated using results from Table 10.
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frequency behaviour than is possible with the popular quarterly-aggregated
data, and it allows us to test whether the entity-level response to the
Directive differs from the country-level deposit response. We found a large
reduction in the daily count of EU-registered accounts for the last week
leading up to the Directive, for example. We also found that the entity-level
response to the Directive is the same in direction and significance as the
country-level deposit response.
The implications of our findings are that offshore tax evasion strategies
are highly substitutable (Zucman 2013a; Johannesen 2014). The Directive
can be described as a partial effort to combat evasion, as it leaves scope for
substitution. It only deals with interest income, allowing for different assets
to be held; it only deals with assets that are directly owned, allowing for the
use of sham corporations; and it only cooperates with specific offshore
centres, the rest of which escape its jurisdiction. This calls for anti-evasion
policies that are broader in scope and scale.
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Appendix
The first two points raised in the “Context” section – (1) the Directive only
applies to EU and cooperating offshore jurisdictions and (2) the Directive
only applies to entities whose beneficial ownership is registered to EU
residents – are illustrated clearly in Table A.1. The first row shows that
entities incorporated in, say, the BVI (a cooperative jurisdiction) and owned
by EU residents fall within the scope of the Directive. EU residents can
transfer beneficial ownership to, say, a resident in the BVI, giving us the
situation in the second row where the offshore entity is no longer within the
Directive’s scope. EU residents can also retain beneficial ownership and
transfer their entity to a non-cooperating jurisdiction, say, Samoa, giving us
the situation in the third row, where the entity is again not within the
Directive’s scope.
Table A.1. Substitution of ownership and jurisdiction




Notes: The first column refers to the offshore entity’s beneficial ownership. If this is
EU, and if the offshore jurisdiction is cooperative, then the Directive applies (row 1).
The Directive can be evaded by transferring beneficial ownership to a non-EU person
or entity (row 2) or by transferring the entity to a non-cooperative offshore
jurisdiction (row 3).
EU = European Union; BVI = British Virgin Islands.
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A point of clarification is necessary here. According to Article 2(1) of the
Directive, interest payments do not fall within the Directive’s scope if the
beneficial owner of the interest payment is a legal person – an entity – rather
than an individual – a natural person. This seemingly poses a problem
for our study, which relies on entity data, and seemingly provides
an opportunity for avoidance as beneficial owners can transfer ownership
to entities, thereby evading the Directive’s focus on natural persons.
However, to guard against this obvious loophole, Article 4(2) of the
Directive includes a broadening of the definition of “paying agent”. When
paying agents transfer interest income to another entity, they must
“communicate the name and address of the entity and the total amount of
interest paid” to the component authority of its Member State [EC 2003,
Article 4(2)]. This exchange of information clause means that
“look-through entities” and other interposing partnerships between the
payer and recipient of interest payments cannot be used to avoid the
Directive (Helminen 2011, 322).
This interpretation of the Directive – that it affects entities – is not
uncontroversial. Some work excludes the possibility based on the de jure
clauses (e.g. Rixen and Schwarz 2012, 157), but the evidence we present
here shows that it does. It is difficult to provide an alternative explanation
for the effects we find here. Also consider that the Directive’s stricter
regulations led CTL staff to complain in internal e-mails that sales volumes
had fallen 20% year on year and of “significant legal changes which many
clients see as making the BVI a somewhat less ‘friendly’ place to base a
company than other competing jurisdictions” (CTL 2008). Evidence aside,
even if paying agents are paying directly to an entity they must, as we said
above, report the identity of the ultimate beneficial owners if they know
they are EU residents. They are duty-bound to find this out. In these cases,
the paying agents “must look through this legal person or arrangement”
(Panayi 2013, 70). This makes “the Savings Directive of relevance to
persons other than individuals” (Panayi 2013, 70).
At every inter-entity interest payment within EU and cooperative
jurisdictions, identity and residence information must be provided to the
authorities. This evidence must show who the beneficial owner is. Paying
agents are under the Directive bound to collect this information as per
Article 3(2). A reluctance to share this information provides an incentive to
move both entities and beneficial ownership out of the Directive’s reach.
Indeed, any entity incorporated in a Member State or cooperative
jurisdiction to which interest is paid, or for which interest is secured for the
benefit of the beneficial owner, is considered under the Directive to be a
paying agent upon receiving the interest payment. When interest is paid or
credited to an account held by such entity, it is considered an interest
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payment made by such an entity. In this way, the Directive “affects” or
“covers” entities.
Beneficial owners can avoid this by (1) transferring their residence out of
the EU, meaning the entity is not beneficially owned by an EU resident to
begin with; (2) transferring their entity out of the EU or cooperative
jurisdiction, meaning their entity is in an offshore centre that did not sign on
to the Directive; or (3) doing both.
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